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INTRODUCTION 
Unhealthy diets are contributing to alarming levels of obesity, 
cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, and certain cancers 
throughout the United States.1  While high-fat, sugar- and sodium-
laden diets are major contributors, one of the most important 
causative factors is the increased consumption of sugary beverages, 
which include beverages that contain added caloric sweeteners such 
as flavored milks, fruit drinks, sports drinks, and sodas.2  Sugary 
beverages are the single largest source of added sugar in the 
American diet.3  Higher intake of sugary beverages among children 
was associated with a fifty-five percent higher risk of being 
overweight or obese than those with lower intake.4 
Although federal and state governments have taken some 
proactive measures to prevent diet-related diseases, local 
governments have emerged as key innovators to promote healthier 
diets.5  Innovative local measures include menu labeling laws, a soda 
portion cap, soda taxes, and warning labels.6  These interventions 
seek to discourage overconsumption of fats, sodium, and sugars, 
which raises tensions between health promotion and the food and 
beverage industry’s commercial interests in promoting products and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SCIENTIFIC REPORT OF THE 2015 DIETARY GUIDELINES 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE: ADVISORY REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES AND THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE 2 (2015). 
 2. See Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic Benefits of 
Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599, 1599–1601 (2009). 
 3. Frank B. Hu, Resolved: There Is Sufficient Scientific Evidence That 
Decreasing Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Consumption Will Reduce the Prevalence of 
Obesity and Obesity-Related Diseases, 14 OBESITY REVS. 606, 606 (2013). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Belinda Reeve et al., State and Municipal Innovations in Obesity Policy: 
Why Localities Remain a Necessary Laboratory for Innovation, 105 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 442, 442–48 (2015). 
 6. See infra Section II.C. 
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maximizing profits.7  Although cities are making progress to 
encourage and promote healthier diets,8 these local governments 
must prepare for the inevitable resistance from powerful food and 
beverage industry actors, including litigation, which can undermine 
innovative, evidence-based public health measures.9 
Part I of this Article discusses the rise of diet-related chronic 
diseases and the serious social and economic impacts on individuals 
and societies.  Part II examines federal, state, and local government 
interventions to prevent these diseases.  Part III discusses food and 
beverage industry efforts to undermine public health regulations, 
including lobbying and public messaging.  Analyzing four case studies 
from cities throughout the United States, Part IV identifies litigation 
as a key component of the food and beverage industry’s strategy to 
undermine local government measures promoting healthier diets.  
Part V argues that local jurisdictions should prepare to defend their 
public health laws and policies against industry litigation and suggests 
steps to help ensure legal viability, political sustainability, and public 
support. 
I.  DIET-RELATED CHRONIC DISEASES 
Over the last four decades, there has been a significant rise in 
overweight and obesity in the United States.10  These medical 
conditions are unhealthy, harmful, and increase the risk of other 
chronic and terminal health problems, including type 2 diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease, and certain cancers.11  Recognizing these 
health risks, and social and economic impacts, is imperative to fully 
appreciate the gravity of the current public health crisis, which 
demands meaningful attention from federal, state, and local 
governments. 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See Lawrence O. Gostin, Tackling Obesity and Disease: The Culprit Is Sugar; 
the Response Is Legal Regulation, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5–7 (2018). 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. J.N. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 1999–
2000, 288 JAMA 1723, 1723–27 (2002); J.E. Manson & S.S. Bassuk, Obesity in the 
United States: A Fresh Look at Its High Toll, 289 JAMA 229, 229–30 (2003). 
 11. Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/causes.html [https://perma.cc/8S34-
HYRD]; The Health Effects of Overweight and Obesity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/effects/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/MXD5-N5K8]. 
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A. The Rise of Diet-Related Chronic Diseases 
Public health professionals have raised concerns about the rapid 
rise of diet-related chronic diseases.  According to a 2011 study, 
“nearly 70% of adults are classified as overweight or obese compared 
with fewer than 25% forty years ago.”12  In 2014, more than one third 
of adults in the United States had obesity.13  Among U.S. children 
aged two through nineteen years, one in six, or approximately 
seventeen percent, had obesity.14  These statistics indicate that obesity 
now affects a significant portion of the population. 
Public health and medical officials are particularly concerned about 
rising obesity rates because obesity causes many adverse health 
effects and is associated with an increased risk of premature death.15  
Furthermore, “[i]f the current trends continue, obesity may overtake 
cigarette abuse as the leading cause of preventable disease.”16  The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has noted that 
people who have obesity are at greater risk for a number of harmful 
and potentially fatal diseases or conditions, including: 
[H]igh blood pressure (Hypertension), [h]igh LDL cholesterol, low 
HDL cholesterol, or high levels of triglycerides (Dyslipidemia), 
[t]ype 2 diabetes, [c]oronary heart disease, [s]troke, [g]allbladder 
disease, [o]steoarthritis (a breakdown of cartilage and bone within a 
joint), [s]leep apnea and breathing problems, [s]ome 
cancers . . . (endometrial, breast, colon, kidney, gallbladder, and 
liver), [l]ow quality of life, [m]ental illness such as clinical 
depression, anxiety, and other mental disorders, [and] [b]ody pain 
and difficulty with physical functioning.17 
Notably, obesity disproportionately affects low-income and 
minority populations.  In 2014, the obesity rate among non-Hispanic 
black adults was 48.1% compared to 42.5% of Hispanic adults and 
34.5% of non-Hispanic white adults.18  The obesity rate among 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Carl J. Lavie et al., Obesity and Cardiovascular Disease: Risk Factor, 
Paradox, and Impact of Weight Loss, 53 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1925, 1925 (2009). 
 13. Adult Obesity Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html [https://perma.cc/AE9D-HHBX]. 
 14. Childhood Obesity Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/childhood.html [https://perma.cc/F54D-4G8W]. 
 15. Luma Akil & H. Anwar Ahmad, Relationships Between Obesity and 
Cardiovascular Diseases in Four Southern States and Colorado, 22 J. HEALTH CARE 
FOR POOR & UNDERSERVED 61, 63–64 (2011). 
 16. Id. at 64. 
 17. Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, supra note 11. 
 18. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
PREVALENCE OF OBESITY AMONG ADULTS AND YOUTH: UNITED STATES, 2011–2014, 
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Hispanic children was 21.9% compared to 19.5% of non-Hispanic 
black children and 14.7% of non-Hispanic white children.19  
According to a 2015 study, the association between race and ethnicity 
and childhood obesity disappeared after controlling for family 
income, indicating that socioeconomic status is more important than 
race or ethnicity in predicting childhood obesity.20  Obesity and its 
related health impacts threaten the most vulnerable populations. 
B. Costs of Diet-Related Chronic Diseases 
In addition to the health and equity impacts of diet-related chronic 
diseases, their increased prevalence raises significant concerns about 
the economic impacts on individuals, families, and society.21  There 
are two types of costs associated with the treatment of chronic diet-
related diseasesdirect costs and indirect costs.22  Direct costs result 
from medical treatment, both inpatient and outpatient, including 
surgeries, drug therapy, and laboratory and radiological tests.23  
According to the CDC, the medical care costs of obesity are 
estimated to be $147 billion per year.24  A 2011 study estimated that 
the annual direct medical costs for people with obesity were $1,723 
higher than normal weight persons.25  Professor John Cawley and 
Professor Chad Meyerhoefer estimate that obesity-related health care 
costs constitute 20.6% of national expenditures on health care.26 
In addition to direct economic costs, obesity-related diseases result 
in significant indirect costs, including absenteeism, lack of 
productivity at work, increased insurance premiums, and lower 
                                                                                                                 
at 2 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db219.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E25V-GE8D]. 
 19. Id. at 4. 
 20. Robert Rogers et al., The Relationship Between Childhood Obesity, Low 
Socioeconomic Status, and Race/Ethnicity: Lessons from Massachusetts, 
11 CHILDHOOD OBESITY 691, 691 (2015). 
 21. See Benjamin H. Harris & Aurite Werman, Obesity Costs Evident at the 
State Level, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: UP FRONT BLOG (Dec. 12, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/12/12/obesity-costs-evident-at-the-
state-level/ [https://perma.cc/R26B-8N45]. 
 22. See Obesity Prevention Source: Economic Costs, HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. 
OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/obesity-prevention-source/obesity-
consequences/economic/ [https://perma.cc/B2EU-7WX4]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Adult Obesity Causes and Consequences, supra note 11.  Estimates are in 
2008 dollars. 
 25. Adam Gilden Tsai et al., Direct Medical Cost of Overweight and Obesity in 
the United States: A Quantitative Systematic Review, 12 OBESITY REV. 50, 55 (2011). 
 26. John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An 
Instrumental Variables Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219, 226 (2012). 
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wages.27  According to the CDC, the “annual nationwide productive 
costs of obesity-related absenteeism range between $3.38 billion ($79 
per obese individual) and $6.38 billion ($132 per obese individual).”28 
If left unchecked, the rising prevalence of diet-related diseases 
poses serious consequences for population health, the healthcare 
system, and the economy more broadly.29  Preventative measures, 
discussed in Part II, can improve individual and population health 
outcomes and reduce the economic costs of chronic diet-related 
diseases. 
II.  GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO PROMOTE HEALTHY DIETS AND 
PREVENT DIET-RELATED CHRONIC DISEASES 
As a result of the severe health impacts and social and economic 
costs of diet-related disease, federal, state, and local governments are 
taking steps to promote healthier diets and prevent obesity.  Public 
officials have a range of legal and policy interventions at their 
disposal, including public awareness campaigns, nutrition information 
and warnings on food labels and menu boards, taxes and subsidies, 
and marketing restrictions. 
A. Federal Government Action 
The federal government, primarily through the Food and Drug 
Agency (“FDA”) and the United States Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”), has taken steps to address obesity and nutrition.  The 
FDA is responsible for “ensuring the safety of our nation’s food 
supply,” among other functions.30  Among its numerous 
responsibilities, the FDA oversees the Nutrition Facts label on food 
packaging, which includes information on calories, fats, sodium, and 
vitamins.31  In May 2016, the FDA significantly updated the Nutrition 
Facts label, requiring disclosure of the amount of added sugars in 
grams and expressed as a percentage of the recommended daily 
maximum intake, based on a 2000-calorie daily diet.32  The new 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Obesity Prevention Source: Economic Costs, supra note 22. 
 28. Adult Obesity Causes & Consequences, supra note 11. 
 29. Y Claire Wang et al., Health and Economic Burden of the Projected Obesity 
Trends in the USA and the UK, 378 LANCET 815, 821–22 (2011). 
 30. See What We Do: FDA Mission, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/#mission [https://perma.cc/KRJ7-5U53]. 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A FOOD 
LABELING GUIDE: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 43 (2013). 
 32. See Annie Gasparro & Mike Esterl, FDA Approves New Nutrition Panel 
That Highlights Sugar Levels, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
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Nutrition Facts label requirements were due to take effect in July 
2018; however, the FDA recently issued a proposed rule extending 
compliance dates to 2020 for large manufacturers and 2021 for 
smaller companies.33 
The USDA also issues policies and regulations to encourage 
healthier diets and prevent obesity.  Every five years, the USDA, 
together with the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”), is required to publish a report containing dietary guidelines 
based on the preponderance of current scientific and medical 
knowledge.34  The USDA also administers the National School Lunch 
Program, a meal program providing low-cost or free nutritionally 
balanced lunches to children.35 
Despite some progress, policy and law-making at the federal level 
is impacted by interest group politics and lobbying,36 which contribute 
to slow and inadequate action on obesity prevention.37  The Trump 
administration has indicated it may roll back diet-related measures 
adopted under the Obama administration (e.g., the Healthy, Hunger-
Free Kids Act (2010)).38  Lack of political will at the federal level 
leaves state and local governments as the most likely actors to take 
meaningful action to prevent and control obesity in the coming years. 
B. State Government Programs 
Although state governments enjoy broad authority to legislate on 
matters of public health and nutrition, state efforts in response to 
commercial food and beverage marketing and unhealthy eating 
patterns have largely focused on educational settings.  Between 2012 
and 2013, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia adopted 
legislation relating to nutrition in schools or authorized funding for 
school nutrition programs, which aim to increase access to healthy 
                                                                                                                 
articles/fda-approves-controversial-changes-to-nutrition-facts-panel-1463750195 
[https://perma.cc/VPX3-K7KL]. 
 33. See Proposed Extension of Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,753, 45,754 
(proposed Oct. 2, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
 34. See generally National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Act of 
1990, 7 U.S.C. § 5341 (2012). 
 35. National School Lunch Program (NSLP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD & 
NUTRITION SERV. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/nslp/national-school-
lunch-program-nslp [https://perma.cc/6NDJ-9RF3]. 
 36. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 37. See generally Reeve et al., supra note 5. 
 38. Jessica Taylor, Trump Administration Rolls Back Michelle Obama’s Healthy 
School Lunch Push, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 1, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/
05/01/526451207/trump-administration-rolls-back-2-of-michelle-obamas-signature-
initiatives [https://perma.cc/SJK6-YL93]. 
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food products.39  In Colorado, for example, lawmakers prohibited the 
provision or sale of food items containing any amount of industrially 
produced trans-fat in public and charter schools.40  In addition to 
nutrition standards and funding, states have also adopted laws on 
nutrition education, physical activity and education, body mass index 
(“BMI”) and student fitness screening, and diabetes screening and 
management in schools.41 
Despite legislative proposals and advocacy efforts on issues such as 
taxes on sugary drinks, state governments have passed few legislative 
measures outside educational and community settings.  Facing 
significant industry opposition, proposed public health-based taxes on 
sugary drinks have failed in the California and New York state 
legislatures.42  Multiple states have failed in their efforts to ban the 
use of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) 
benefits to purchase sugary drinks.43  The USDA, which administers 
SNAP, has denied state waiver requests that sought to exempt 
unhealthy products from SNAP eligibility, recommending states 
incentivize healthy food purchases rather than restricting SNAP-
eligible products.44  Like the federal government, state government 
action on nutrition and obesity is hampered by industry opposition, 
limited political will, and the complexities inherent in ensuring food 
                                                                                                                 
 39. See, e.g., S. 12-068, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012); AMY 
WINTERFELD, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS., STATE ACTIONS TO REDUCE AND 
PREVENT CHILDHOOD OBESITY IN SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES 3, 11 (2014).  The 
report defines school nutrition programs as those that “help ensure that students 
have access to healthier food and beverage options at school or encourage other 
community supports for child nutrition.” WINTERFELD, supra, at 11.  Other categories 
analyzed in the report include nutrition education and farm-to-school programs. Id. 
at 17. 
 40. See Colo. S. 12-068; WINTERFELD, supra note 39, at 12. 
 41. See generally WINTERFELD, supra note 39. 
 42. Anemona Hartocollis, Failure of State Soda Tax Plan Reflects Power of an 
Antitax Message, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/
nyregion/03sodatax.html [https://nyti.ms/2h91w2a] (discussing New York’s failure to 
pass a tax on sugary beverages); Jeremy B. White, California Soda Tax Bill Pulled 
Without a Vote, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.sacbee.com/
news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article71436032.html [https://perma.cc/WM45-
GXN3] (reporting on failed legislation in California that would have imposed a two-
cent tax on sugary beverages). 
 43. Caitlin Dewey, State Group: USDA Mulling Big Changes to Food Stamps, 
Including Allowing States to Impose Soda Ban, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 8, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/12/08/state-group-usda-
mulling-big-changes-to-food-stamps-including-allowing-states-to-impose-soda-
ban/?utm_term=.865d7c1056c7 [https://perma.cc/SM6X-JD9Z]. 
 44. Id. 
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systems and environments that provide accessible, affordable, 
sufficient, and nutritious food for all. 
C. Local Government Initiatives 
Local governments have emerged as innovators and leaders in 
public health laws and policies to prevent obesity and promote 
healthier diets.  “Home-rule,” the delegation of state power to local 
jurisdictions, enables local governments to adopt laws and perform 
functions that are typically reserved for state governments.45  In many 
instances, local governments have adopted innovative and progressive 
reforms that have failed at the state and federal levels.46  Bolder 
reforms are enabled by a range of factors including smaller, more 
homogeneous constituencies, less bureaucratic and time-consuming 
law-making procedures, and proximity to constituents and their 
challenges.47  Innovative local government initiatives to promote 
access to nutritionally adequate diets include a Minneapolis 
ordinance requiring grocery stores to stock staple foods48 and 
increasing the available number of vending permits to sell fresh fruit 
and vegetables from food carts in underserved areas of New York 
City.49  Many local jurisdictions, including Boston and Baltimore, 
incentivize the use of SNAP benefits at farmers’ markets, which has 
increased consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables among SNAP 
participants.50 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Patrick M. Steel, Obesity Regulation Under Home Rule: An Argument That 
Regulation by Local Governments Is Superior to Administrative Agencies, 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1127, 1131 n.22 (2016). 
 46. Id. at 1139–42; see also H.R. 1687, 114th Cong. (2015) (referring to the 
Subcommittee on Health); Mark Bittman, Opinion, Introducing the National Soda 
Tax, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/opinion/mark-
bittman-introducing-the-national-soda-tax.html [https://nyti.ms/1laWE5B] (discussing 
a proposed federal soda tax).  The proposed tax discussed in the article did not 
advance past the House committee level.  
 47. Reeve et al., supra note 5, at 445. 
 48. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE 10, § 203 (2017); see also Minneapolis 
Health Dep’t, Staple Food Ordinance, MINNEAPOLISMN.GOV (Oct. 10, 2017), 
http://www.minneapolismn.gov/health/living/eating/staple-foods [https://perma.cc/XL
35-LNAM] (“[The ordinance] requires licensed grocery stores (including corner 
stores, gas stations, dollar stores, and pharmacies) to sell a certain amount of basic 
food items including fruits and vegetables, whole grains, eggs, and low-fat dairy.  The 
staple foods ordinance was originally adopted in 2008, but was amended by the 
Minneapolis City Council in October 2014 to set more comprehensive and clear 
standards for food retailers.”). 
 49. NYC Green Carts, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/
health/health-topics/green-carts.page [https://perma.cc/43UQ-7PWE]. 
 50. Healthy Incentives Programs, CITY OF BOS. (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.boston.gov/departments/food-initiatives/healthy-incentives-program 
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In addition to measures to promote access to healthier foods, local 
jurisdictions have also adopted measures to restrict availability and 
discourage consumption of unhealthy products.  The City of Los 
Angeles, for example, restricts the density of fast food outlets51 and 
many cities and counties ban the sale of sodas and other unhealthy 
food and beverage products in schools.52 
Public health-based taxes on sugary beverages, which can 
discourage consumption, raise revenue for governments, and 
encourage manufacturers to decrease the amount of sugar in their 
products,53 are increasingly popular throughout the United States and 
globally.  After reviewing evidence from early adopters including 
Mexico and the city of Berkeley, California, the World Health 
Organization (“WHO”) recommended that governments adopt excise 
taxes on sugary drinks, concluding that “[s]uch taxes lead to more 
than proportional reductions in . . . consumption and net reductions in 
caloric intake, and thus contribute to improving nutrition and 
reducing overweight, obesity and NCDs.”54  Following Mexico’s 
adoption of a one-peso-per-liter tax in 2013, sales of taxed products 
                                                                                                                 
[https://perma.cc/M45U-82K7]; Md. Farmers Market Ass’n, Using SNAP Benefits at 
the Baltimore Farmers Market and Bazaar!, MD. FARMERS MKT. ASS’N: BLOG (Oct. 
20, 2014), http://www.marylandfma.org/using-snap-benefits-at-the-baltimore-farmers-
market-and-bazaar/ [https://perma.cc/QV95-CPX9] (“Maryland Market Money 
provides a $1 for $1 match, up to $10, per week when you spend your SNAP benefits 
at market.  Customers can earn an additional $10 each week at market, as long as 
they spend their SNAP benefits with a participating vendor!”). 
 51. L.A., Cal., Fast Food Interim Control Ordinance 180103 (July 29, 2008). 
 52. Felice J. Freyer, Chances Are, Boston Schools Are Safe from Sugary Drinks, 
BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/03/03/sugary-
drinks-have-nearly-disappeared-from-boston-schools-study-finds/D9KM5qT1zGFA
USCEHPWCzN/story.html [https://perma.cc/H87Z-3PC6]. 
 53. Sarah A. Roache & Lawrence O. Gostin, The Untapped Power of Soda 
Taxes: Incentivizing Consumers, Generating Revenue, and Altering Corporate 
Behavior, 6 INT’L J. HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 489, 490–91 (2017); see also Allison 
Aubrey, PepsiCo Pledges to Cut Sugar as Big Soda Comes Under Scrutiny, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/10/17/49827
4851/pepsico-pledges-to-cut-sugar-as-bigsoda-comes-under-scrutiny [https://perma.cc/
2YUM-7MTP]; Abby Norman, Pepsi Will Cut the Amount of Sugar in Its Sodas, & 
It’s a Small Step Forward, ROMPER (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.romper.com/p/ 
pepsi-will-cut-the-amount-of-sugar-in-its-sodas-its-a-small-step-forward-20664 
[https://perma.cc/VH8N-ES7E]. 
 54. WORLD HEALTH ORG., FISCAL POLICIES FOR DIET AND PREVENTION OF 
NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES 24 (2016).  The WHO also recommends that 
governments adopt taxes that raise retail prices of sugary beverages by at least twenty 
percent. Id. 
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fell by 5.5% in the first year and 9.7% in the second year.55  In 2014, 
Berkeley became the first U.S. jurisdiction to implement a public 
health-based tax on sugary drinks.56  In the first year, consumption in 
Berkeley’s low-income neighborhoods fell by 21%.57  As of January 
2018, six U.S. jurisdictions are levying similar taxes.58  Although 
sugary drink taxes currently apply to a small fraction of the total 
population, there is growing interest and momentum for such taxes, 
especially among local governments.59 
III.  INDUSTRY ATTEMPTS TO THWART PUBLIC HEALTH 
REGULATIONS 
Taxes on sugary drinks, along with other government interventions 
intended to reduce consumption of unhealthy food and beverage 
products, conflict with the notion of individual autonomy and the 
food and beverage industry’s commercial interests in maximizing 
sales and profits.60  The food and beverage industry opposes 
government measures that threaten profits and dedicates significant 
resources to prevent the adoption of such measures and to undermine 
existing ones.  Industry’s strategic approach incorporates lobbying, 
funding, and messaging techniques to influence policy-makers, 
scientific evidence, and public opinion. 
A. Lobbying 
The food and beverage industry, including corporations and trade 
groups, dedicates significant resources to influence federal, state, and 
                                                                                                                 
 55. M. Arantxa Colchero et al., In Mexico, Evidence of Sustained Consumer 
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RADIO (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/04/08/398310036/
the-navajo-nations-tax-on-junk-food-splits-reservation [https://perma.cc/54N7-Y2ET] 
(discussing the Navajo Nation’s adoption of a tax of two percent on unhealthy foods, 
which is not considered high enough to discourage purchases). 
 59. Gostin, supra note 58, at 1. 
 60. Steel, supra note 45, at 1143–44. 
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local law and policy.  Industry seeks to protect its interests by 
influencing broader nutrition and diet policies and by combating 
attempts to regulate the industry and its products.61  Between 2009 
and 2015, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo, and the American Beverage 
Association (“ABA”) spent a total of $114.2 million on federal 
lobbying.62  Specifically: 
The ABA has lobbied against any government action . . . that might 
raise the cost of soda production and marketing or discourage 
consumption . . . [including] against nutrition labeling, packaging 
standards, fair labor standard, the exclusion of sodas from food 
assistance programs and school meals, limitations on franchises, 
quotas on sugar, container deposit laws, and restrictions on 
television advertising to children, among other issues.63 
In the recent 2016 election cycle, the food and beverage industry 
contributed over twenty-five million dollars to national campaigns.64  
In addition to significant spending, the food and beverage industry 
hires lobbyists to meet with members of both houses of Congress, the 
White House, and various government agencies that promulgate 
food-related regulations, including the USDA and the FDA.65 
At the state level, the food and beverage industry has successfully 
pushed for laws that prevent or nullify local government legislation 
on nutrition,66 which is often more restrictive at the local level (e.g., 
soda taxes, menu labeling, and bans on toy giveaways with fast-food 
meals for children).  The legal doctrine of preemption refers to the 
aversion, displacement, or negation of laws by conflicting laws made 
by higher levels of government.67  Powerful industries, such as the 
tobacco and firearms industries, have championed efforts to preempt 
local regulations that could affect their bottom line.68  The American 
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 68. Id. at 3. 
2018] BIG FOOD AND SODA 1063 
Legislative Exchange Council, a group supported by conservative 
foundations and corporations, promotes collaboration between 
lobbyists and lawmakers to disseminate model preemption 
legislation.69  Today, at least nine states have nutrition-related 
preemption laws,70 which prevent local governments enacting 
evidence-based regulations aimed at promoting healthier diets and 
preventing obesity within their communities.71  In Ohio, for example, 
state law preempts local regulation on the provision of nutrition 
information in restaurants (e.g., calorie information on menus) and 
customer incentive items (e.g., toys with children’s meals).72 
In addition to lobbying federal and state lawmakers and agencies, 
the food and beverage industry also lobbies at the local level.  
Companies and trade associations hire well-connected consultants 
with ties to local liberal and conservative politicians.  In its efforts to 
oppose taxes on sugary drinks in San Francisco and Berkeley, for 
example, the soda industry engaged a research firm that had 
previously worked for Michelle Obama’s Let’s Move! initiative and 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the nation’s largest public 
health philanthropy organization.73  In Cook County, the Can the Tax 
Coalition and other repeal advocates lobbied individual members of 
the Board of Commissioners, and soda companies made donations to 
commissioners in favor of repeal via political action committees.74  
Looking forward, the rise of local government measures to promote 
healthier diets will likely be accompanied by increased industry 
lobbying at the local level. 
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B. Funding Scientific Research 
As part of its overall strategy, the food and beverage industry has 
funded scientific research that tends to shift the responsibility for 
health impacts away from their products.  Recently uncovered 
internal sugar industry documents chronicle decades of sugar industry 
influence on the development of scientific evidence on sugar and 
heart disease.75 
In 1967, the Sugar Association paid Harvard scientists to publish a 
paper on the relationship between sugar, fat, and heart disease.76  In 
addition to funding the research, Sugar Association executives 
worked closely with the Harvard scientists, supplying articles for 
review and reviewing drafts.  The resulting paper, which was 
published in the New England Journal of Medicine (“NEJM”), was 
developed in response to studies associating sugar with increased 
triglyceride levels linked to heart disease, as well as higher levels of 
insulin directly connected to type 2 diabetes.  The NEJM paper 
minimized the link between sugar and heart health by emphasizing 
the role of fat and saturated fat in cardiovascular problems.77 
The industry-funded research proved successful in its aim to 
minimize the criticism of sugar and shift the focus to fat.78  In 1976, 
the Sugar Association won a public relations award for “influencing 
the public opinion about the health effects of sugar consumption.”79  
One of the Harvard scientists who authored the paper, D. Mark 
Hegsted, later became the head of nutrition at the USDA, where he 
was involved in drafting the forerunner to the federal government’s 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Cristin E. Kearns et al., Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease 
Research: A Historical Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 176 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1, 1–2 (2016). 
 76. Anahad O’Connor, How the Sugar Industry Shifted Blame to Fat, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/13/well/eat/how-the-sugar-industry-
shifted-blame-to-fat.html [https://nyti.ms/2jDtsxa].  According to the organization’s 
website, the Sugar Association is:  
[T]he scientific voice of the U.S. sugar industry, making a difference by 
continuously supporting scientific research and sharing our knowledge of 
sugar to increase consumer understanding and confidence in the role that 
sugar plays in a nutritious, balanced and enjoyable diet . . . . The Sugar 
Association, founded by members of the U.S. sugar industry, began in 1943 
as the Sugar Research Foundation, dedicated to the scientific study of 
sugar’s role in food and communication of that role to the public.  In 1947, 
the Association assumed its current name.  
About Us, SUGAR ASS’N, https://www.sugar.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/QPB2-
TQ6Z]. 
 77. O’Connor, supra note 76. 
 78. Id. 
 79. SUGAR COATED (Cutting Factory 2015). 
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dietary guidelines.80  Research suggests that the sugar industry may 
have had a long history of influencing federal diet and nutrition 
policy.81 
Industry efforts to influence scientific research continue to the 
present day.  A recent analysis found that studies sponsored by the 
food and beverage industry were five times more likely to find no 
positive association between consumption of sugary drinks and 
weight gain or obesity than studies that reported no industry funding 
or conflicts of interest.82  Increasing public recognition and criticism 
of industry influence over scientific evidence led to the disbandment 
of the Global Energy Balance Network (“Network”) in 2015.83  The 
Network’s scientists undertook research that tended to blame weight 
gain and obesity on lack of exercise rather than diet.84  Founded in 
2014, the Network received $1.5 million from Coca-Cola.85  Despite 
the Global Energy Balance Network president’s insistence that any 
funding received from Coca-Cola did not influence the organization’s 
activities, emails between the organization and Coca-Cola suggest 
that the company wielded influence over the group’s strategy and 
development.86  The chairman of the Department of Nutrition at 
Harvard University, along with thirty-six other scientists, penned an 
open letter criticizing the work of the Global Energy Balance 
Network as “scientific nonsense.”87 
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C. Public Messaging 
Industry-funded research feeds into the food and beverage 
industry’s larger public messaging strategy, which emphasizes the 
industry’s economic benefits, individual choice, personal 
responsibility, and consumption of unhealthy food and beverage 
products as an appropriate part of healthy lifestyles, including 
balanced diets and physical activity.88  The ABA, together with Coca-
Cola, Pepsi Co., and the Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, created a 
website advising consumers on maintaining a healthy lifestyle while 
nevertheless consuming their products.89  This website promotes the 
idea that the key to a healthy lifestyle is “energy balance,” balancing 
calories consumed with calories expended through exercise.90  The 
website highlights product reformulation efforts by the industry, the 
wide range of beverage choices available to consumers, and industry-
sponsored initiatives to promote healthier communities.91  Echoing 
the work of the Global Energy Balance Network, this website 
promotes unhealthy products under the guise of consumer 
information in a manner that tends to shift the blame for obesity away 
from their products to a lack of exercise. 
D. Funding “Grassroots” Opposition 
Amplifying the impact of its public messaging strategy, the food 
and beverage industry fosters “grassroots” opposition to laws and 
regulations promoting healthier diets and nutrition.  Groups, such as 
New Yorkers for Beverage Choices, Philadelphians Against the 
Grocery Tax, and Can the Tax Coalition, typically receive support 
and resources from the food and beverage industry to build a 
coalition of individuals, small businesses, and community groups to 
oppose proposed measures in their local jurisdictions.92  Through 
activities that include flyer distribution, media appearances, 
advertising, and public protests, these groups provide local voices 
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warning of the intrusion of the “nanny state” and of potential 
negative economic impacts on communities and families.93  Part IV 
examines specific examples of industry-supported “grassroots” 
advocacy against local government measures in New York City, 
Philadelphia, and Cook County, Illinois.  Given the rise in local 
governments’ use of their authority to discourage the consumption of 
unhealthy products, the food and beverage industry will likely 
continue to use innovative methods to generate maximum opposition 
against measures that threaten their profits. 
IV.  INDUSTRY LITIGATION CHALLENGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
MEASURES TO PROMOTE HEALTHIER DIETS 
Litigation forms a key part of the food and beverage industry’s 
strategy to limit local government measures that promote healthier 
diets.  This Article reports on research analyzing cases brought by the 
food and beverage industry or industry-supported groups against 
local governments in the United States, challenging the legality of 
measures intended to discourage the consumption of unhealthy food 
and beverage products and in which judgments have been delivered.  
The increase in local government measures that conflict with the food 
and beverage industry’s commercial interests will likely be met with 
an increase in this type of litigation.  This part discusses four cases. 
A. New York City Soda Portion Cap Rule 
In September 2012, the New York City Board of Health adopted 
the “Portion Cap Rule,” which prohibited the sale of sugary drinks in 
containers larger than sixteen ounces.94  The Portion Cap Rule 
formed part of New York City’s broader strategy to reduce diet-
related chronic diseases among the city’s residents.95  An opposition 
campaign, led by New Yorkers For Beverage Choices, an industry-
backed grassroots-style group, framed the rule as an encroachment on 
personal freedoms by Mayor Bloomberg’s “nanny state.”96  
Opponents of the rule also cultivated relationships with minority 
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lawmakers and argued against the rule on the basis that it would 
disproportionately impact vulnerable populations, as well as minority-
owned businesses.97  Between 2009 and 2015, the beverage industry 
spent more than fifteen million dollars in New York State 
campaigning against the Portion Cap Rule and other nutrition-related 
initiatives, including a proposed statewide soda tax.98 
In October 2012, before the Portion Cap Rule went into effect, six 
national and statewide not-for-profit and labor organizations 
commenced a hybrid Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment 
action seeking to invalidate the rule.99  This action, New York 
Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New 
York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene,100 was heard by 
the Supreme Court of the County of New York, which invalidated the 
rule and permanently enjoined the City from implementing it.101  The 
New York court found that the New York City Board of Health was 
an administrative agency and, therefore, did not possess the requisite 
authority to promulgate this law.102  It also held that the rule was 
arbitrary and capricious.103 
The New York State Appellate Division upheld the trial court’s 
judgment on the basis that the board had exceeded the scope of its 
regulatory authority.104  Boreali v. Axelrod,105 an earlier New York 
case on administrative agency authority, sets out a two-step analysis 
to determine whether a government agency has exceeded its 
regulatory authority by engaging in policy-making that is reserved for 
the legislative body.106  First, the court must determine whether the 
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government agency is regulatory or legislative.107  If the agency 
merely possesses regulatory authority, the court should then 
determine whether the agency exceeded this limited authority and 
engaged in legislative policy making.108  If the regulatory agency has, 
in fact, engaged in legislative action or policy-making, the court 
should necessarily invalidate its rule, as it violates the separation of 
powers.109 
Applying Boreali, the New York Court of Appeals held that the 
New York City Board of Health’s role was regulative, rather than 
legislative.110  Referring to the New York City Charter, the court 
determined that the sole legislative body within the city’s government 
is the New York City Council.111  “While the charter empowers the 
City Council ‘to adopt local laws for . . . public welfare,’” it also limits 
the New York City Board of Health’s rulemaking authority to the 
publication of the health code.112  Under the City Charter, the New 
York City Board of Health has the authority to “add to and alter, 
amend or repeal any part of the health code, . . . [to] publish 
additional provisions for security of life and health in the city and [to] 
confer additional powers on the [Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene] not inconsistent with the constitution, laws of this state or 
this charter.”113  Given these limitations, the court determined that 
the New York City Board of Health’s authority was restricted to 
regulatory functions.114 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See id. at 1353–57; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 543–45. 
 108. See Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1353–57; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d 
at 543–45. 
 109. See Boreali, 517 N.E.2d at 1353. 
 110. See N.Y. Statewide Coal., 16 N.E.3d at 543–45. 
 111. Id. at 542. 
 112. Id. at 544 (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 28(a) (2004)).  The Charter further 
prevents the N.Y.C. Board of Health from intruding on the city council’s legislative 
power by limiting the N.Y.C. Board of Health’s authority to matters within the 
authority of the Department of Health. Id.  
 113. Id. (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 558(b)).  Notably, the New York City 
Charter sets out that “[t]he City Council is the sole legislative branch of City 
government; it is ‘the legislative body of the city . . . vested with the legislative power 
of the city.’” Id. at 543 (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 21). 
 114. Id. at 544 (quoting N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 28(a)) (“Nonetheless, the Charter 
contains no suggestion that the Board of Health has the authority to create laws.  
While the Charter empowers the City Council “to adopt local laws . . . for the 
preservation of the public health, comfort, peace and prosperity of the city and its 
inhabitants, the Charter restricts the Board’s rulemaking to the publication of a 
health code, an entirely different endeavor.”). 
1070 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
The court then turned to whether “the Board properly exercised its 
regulatory authority in adopting the Portion Cap Rule.”115  The court 
emphasized that the Boreali analysis should “center on the theme 
that ‘it is the province of the people’s elected representative, rather 
than appointed administrator, to resolve difficult social problems by 
making choices among competing ends.’”116  Therefore, “[t]he focus 
must be on whether the challenged regulation attempts to resolve 
difficult social problems in this manner,” and the task of this policy-
making is reserved to the legislative branch.117  In analyzing the 
Portion Cap Rule, the court determined that (1) crafting the Portion 
Cap Rule required complexity that exceeded simple rule-making and 
drifted into policy-making due to “value judgments concerning 
personal autonomy and economics”;118 (2) the New York City Board 
of Health did not have any policy foundation upon which to craft the 
rule and thus “did not simply fill in details guided by independent 
legislation”;119 and (3) the New York City Board of Health tried to 
“fill the vacuum and impose a solution of its own.”120  Given these 
factors, the court concluded that the Board of Health’s conduct had 
amounted to policy-making, thereby exceeding its regulatory 
authority.121  Because the regulatory agency engaged in impermissible 
policy-making, the court of appeals invalidated the Portion Cap 
Rule.122 
B. Philadelphia Soda Tax 
In June 2016, the Philadelphia City Council voted 13-4 in favor of 
the Philadelphia Beverage Tax (“PBT”), a. 1.5-cent-per-ounce tax on 
sugary, diet, and low-calorie beverages.123  The PBT was expected to 
raise ninety million dollars annually.124  Philadelphia Mayor Jim 
Kenney championed the tax as an additional source of revenue to 
improve community resources, including parks, recreation centers, 
and libraries, and to fund universal pre-kindergarten for 
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Philadelphia’s children.125  Mayor Kenney’s public statements 
emphasized the tax’s revenue raising potential, paying little attention 
to the potential public health benefits of the tax.126  Opponents of the 
tax, including the industry-funded group Philadelphians Against the 
Grocery Tax, framed the tax as an unfair intrusion on personal choice 
that would raise grocery bills and cause job losses.127  Both opponents 
and supporters, such as the group Philadelphians for a Fair Future, 
spent millions of dollars promoting their view of the tax to the public.  
During the first half of 2017, the ABA spent more than three million 
dollars on advertisements opposing the tax.128  Between mid-July and 
mid-September of the same year, Michael Bloomberg, the former 
Mayor of New York City, contributed over two million dollars to 
fund ads in favor of the tax.129 
In addition to seeking to shape public opinion against the tax, the 
ABA, together with a group of individuals and small businesses, filed 
a lawsuit challenging the tax in September 2016.130  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the PBT is preempted by state tax laws and federal 
SNAP regulations and violates the Uniformity Clause of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.131  The Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas dismissed the lawsuit in December 2016, enabling the tax to go 
into effect shortly thereafter.132  The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal 
to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, which heard arguments 
in April 2017 and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal in June 2017.133 
The commonwealth court upheld the lower court’s finding that the 
PBT was not preempted by Pennsylvania State tax law.134  Under the 
Pennsylvania Sterling Act, which aims to protect against double 
taxation by city and state governments, cities have broad local 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. 
 126. Luc Cohen, Philadelphia Passes Soda Tax After Mayor Rewrites Playbook, 
REUTERS (June 16, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-beverages-philadelphia-
sodatax/philadelphia-passes-soda-tax-after-mayor-rewrites-playbook-idUSKCN0Z2
2G3 [https://perma.cc/6GE9-V4K4]. 
 127. FAQs, NO PHILLY GROCERY TAX, http://nophillygrocerytax.com/faq.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/476Z-8EHQ]. 
 128. Joe Trinacria, All Those Philly Soda Tax Ads Cost $5.4 Million This Year, 
PHILLY MAG. (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2017/09/27/soda-tax-
lobbyists-spent-millions-tv-ads/ [https://perma.cc/6SSQ-9HVU]. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 164 A.3d 576, 576, 580–81 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2017). 
 131. Id. at 580–82. 
 132. Id. at 580–84. 
 133. Id. at 579. 
 134. Id. at 587. 
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taxation authority to generate revenue but are preempted from 
exercising this authority on a product or transaction subject to a state 
tax.135  In the current case, the plaintiffs claimed that the PBT was 
preempted by the state’s existing sales tax on sugary beverages and 
sodas.136  The commonwealth court rejected this argument, holding 
that the tax is not duplicative because the city tax is levied on non-
retail distributions whereas the state tax is levied on retail sales and 
payable by consumers.137 
On the issue of federal preemption, the commonwealth court 
found that SNAP regulations and requirements did not preempt the 
PBT.138  Section 2013(a) of the Federal Food Stamp Act, and section 
204(46) of the Tax Code preclude a government from imposing a tax 
on items bought using SNAP benefits.139  The commonwealth court 
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of this claim, ruling that the 
controlling federal SNAP statute and regulations “only prohibit the 
imposition of a tax on retail purchase transactions, and not a tax on 
non-retail distribution transactions,” such as the current PBT.140  The 
court again emphasized that the PBT is a tax on the “distributors or 
dealers upon distribution,” not the consumer.141  Furthermore, the 
“fact that the PBT may be passed on to recipients through higher 
retail prices does not alter the incidence of the PBT nor transform it 
into a prohibited tax within the purview of [s]ection 2013(a) of the 
Food Stamp Act, its regulations, or [s]ection 204(46) of the Tax 
Code.”142  Thus, because the tax is imposed at the distributor level, it 
is not preempted by state or federal law. 
Finally, the commonwealth court affirmed the lower court’s finding 
that the PBT did not violate the Pennsylvania Constitution’s 
Uniformity Clause.  The Uniformity Clause requires uniform taxation 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Blauner’s Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 198 A. 889, 890–91 (Pa. 1938); see also 
53 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 15971 (West 2017). 
 136. Dan Packel, Philly Defends Soda Tax Against Beverage Groups’ Challenge, 
LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/850051/philly-defends-soda-
tax-against-beverage-groups-challenge [https://perma.cc/K2JJ-63V9]. 
 137. Williams, 164 A.3d at 587 (“The subject matter of the tax, the non-retail 
distribution of sugar-sweetened beverages for sale at retail in the City, and the 
measure of the tax, per ounce of sugar-sweetened beverage, are distinct from the 
Sales Tax imposed under the Tax Code upon the retail sale of the sugar-sweetened 
beverage of the ultimate purchaser.”). 
 138. Id. at 594. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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of items within the same class.143  The commonwealth court held that 
the PBT only created one class: distributors of taxed beverages.144  It 
further found that the manner and measure of calculating the tax 
indicates that it is a specific tax uniformly applied to all members of 
the class, distributors, and therefore meets the requirements of the 
uniformity clause.145 
The soda industry has not been deterred by the commonwealth 
court’s affirmation of the lower court’s dismissal of its claims 
challenging the PBT.  On July 13, 2017, the plaintiffs in the suit filed a 
petition to appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.146  In January 
2018, the court granted the petition on a limited basis, stating it will 
determine whether the tax violates the Sterling Act.147 
C. Cook County Soda Tax 
In November 2016, the Cook County Board of Commissioners 
enacted the Sweetened Beverage Tax Ordinance (“SBTO”), a one-
cent-per-ounce tax on sweetened beverages.148  The ordinance defines 
a “sweetened beverage” as “any non-alcoholic beverage, carbonated 
or non-carbonated, which is intended for human consumption and 
contains any caloric sweetener or non-caloric sweetener, and is 
available for sale in a bottle or produced for sale through the use of 
syrup and/or powder.”149  Exemptions include 100% natural fruit and 
vegetable juices, infant formula, beverages for medical use, and 
“beverages to which a purchaser can add, or request that a retailer 
add, caloric sweetener or non-caloric sweetener.”150  Unlike the PBT, 
                                                                                                                 
 143. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. 
 144. Williams, 164 A.3d at 595. 
 145. Id. at 584 (finding compelling the lower court’s finding that “all distributors 
are subject to the same tax calculation formula and therefore no disparate treatment 
exists within a distributor class in regard to the formula and rate of tax” and that “the 
only classes created by the PBT are distributors and arguably [sugar-sweetened 
beverages] which are one and the same for purposes of this analysis,” and that “[t]he 
consumer and retailer classes identified by [Objectors] are not classes created by the 
PBT and are therefore not subject to tax liability under the PBT.” (alteration in 
original)).  “The PBT is not imposed on the ownership of the sugar-sweetened 
beverages or on their sale; rather, it is only imposed if the beverages are supplied, 
acquired, delivered, or transported for purposes of holding them out for retail sale in 
the City.” Id. at 595. 
 146. Petition for Allowance of Appeal, Williams, 164 A.3d 576 (No. 321 EAL 
2017). 
 147. Order for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court, 
Williams, 164 A.3d 576 (No. 321 EAL 2017). 
 148. Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 16-5931, § 74-852(a) (repealed 2017). 
 149. Id. at § 74-851. 
 150. Id. 
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the SBTO is imposed on the purchaser or consumer, rather than the 
distributor, and the tax must be included in the price of the 
product.151  Perhaps in an effort to avoid potential preemption 
challenges emanating from SNAP regulations, the ordinance indicates 
that ordinarily taxed items purchased using SNAP benefits are 
exempt from the SBTO.152 
The SBTO was enacted in an express “effort to promote public 
health, including lowered obesity rates.”153  The ordinance cited data 
and evidence on the health impacts of consumption of sugary drinks 
from the WHO, the CDC, and the American Medical Association.154  
In addition to public health benefits, the tax was expected to raise 
$200 million in revenue for 2018 alone.155 
In the lead-up to, and following the Board of Commissioners 8-8 
tied vote on the tax, broken by Board President Toni Preckwinkle, 
there had been significant division on the desirability of Cook 
County’s tax.  The Can the Tax Coalition, largely funded by tax 
opponents including the ABA, ran a lengthy and well-resourced 
public messaging campaign framing the tax as an ineffective public 
health measure that would place a heavy economic burden on 
businesses and families.156  As seen in Philadelphia, opponents spent 
heavily on advertisements and public relations, including circulating 
fliers petitioning for the repeal of the tax in local malls and shopping 
centers.  The Can the Tax Coalition spent at least $3.2 million on 
radio and television ads against the tax, while former New York City 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. at § 74-852(b)–(c). 
 152. See id. § 74-852; see also Ill. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Cook Cty. Dep’t of 
Revenue, No. 17 L 50596, 2017 WL 3318078, at *3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 28, 2017).  The 
court explains that in purchases where the consumer is using SNAP benefits to 
purchase the sweetened beverage, the retailer must do one of two things:  
First, if the tax is separately stated on a retailer’s cash register receipts, the 
POS system should be programmed not to charge the tax.  Second, if the tax 
is included in the selling price on a retailer’s cash register receipt, the POS 
system should be programmed to reduce the price by the amount of tax.  If 
this programming is not possible, the retailer must have a procedure 
whereby a purchaser who uses SNAP benefits can receive an immediate 
refund at the customer service desk or other location within the retailer’s 
premises. 
Id. 
 153. Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017 WL 3318078, at *2. 
 154. See generally Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 16-5931 (repealed 2017). 
 155. Jennifer Maloney & Shayndi Raice, Expanded Soda Taxes Stir Pushback, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/expanded-soda-taxes-stir-
pushback-1504288005 [https://perma.cc/H6JL-96LP]. 
 156. Frequently Asked Questions, CAN THE TAX COAL., 
http://www.stopthecookcountytax.com/faq.aspx [https://perma.cc/AH2Q-WMKR]. 
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Mayor Michael Bloomberg spent more than $10 million on ads 
promoting the public health benefits.157 
On June 27, 2017, four days prior to the tax taking effect, the 
plaintiffs, including the Illinois Retail Merchants Association, filed a 
complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment to 
preemptively enjoin collection of the tax.158  The plaintiffs challenged 
the SBTO on two primary grounds, arguing that the SBTO violated 
the Illinois Constitution’s uniformity clause159 and that the ordinance 
was unconstitutionally vague.160  The Circuit Court of Cook County 
rejected these two arguments and upheld the SBTO. 
The court found that the SBTO did not violate Illinois’s uniformity 
clause.  The Illinois Constitution provides for uniform taxation of 
similar products to enforce minimum standards of fairness and 
reasonableness between groups of taxpayers.161  To survive scrutiny, a 
non-property tax classification must (1) be based on a real and 
substantial difference between the people taxed and those not taxed, 
and (2) bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the 
legislation or to public policy.162  The plaintiffs primarily challenged 
the SBTO as non-uniform because the tax does not apply to 
sweetened beverages that are made to order.  The plaintiffs alleged 
that exception (3) of the SBTO, which states that, “beverages to 
which a purchaser can add, or can request that a retailer add, caloric 
sweetener or non-caloric sweetener,” was arbitrary and 
unreasonable.163  Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that pre-made 
sweetened beverages (e.g., bottled frappuccino) and on-demand, 
custom sweetened beverages (e.g., handmade frappuccino) are 
                                                                                                                 
 157. Hal Dardick, Anti-Pop-Tax Hired Guns Pay $11 an Hour for Workers to 
‘Educate’ Cook County Voters on Repeal, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 29, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-cook-county-pop-tax-ads-met-
20170929-story.html [https://perma.cc/X4XN-4S6N]. 
 158. Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017 WL 3318078, at *3. 
 159. Id. at *4.  The plaintiffs argue that while pre-made, or ready-to-drink sugary 
beverages would be subject to the tax, on-demand, or custom sweetened beverages 
were exempted from the tax, therefore creating classifications that are not based on 
any real or substantial differences in violation of the Illinois’s constitution Uniformity 
Clause. Id. 
 160. Id. (“Specifically, the Merchants contend that the Ordinance is inconsistent 
with how sweetened beverages in non-pre-determined size containers (such as 
fountain drinks) are served and is inconsistent and may run afoul of the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), the Illinois Retailers’ 
Occupation Tax, and the City of Chicago’s Alternative Pricing System Rules.”). 
 161. Id. at *5, *8. 
 162. Id. at *5. 
 163. Id. at *2, *6. 
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substantially similar and therefore must be taxed in the same way.164  
The defendants emphasized that the two products are different in two 
distinct ways: (1) pre-made sweetened beverages are more widely 
available and thus more likely to be purchased than on-demand 
specialty drinks, and (2) it is easier to administer the tax on pre-made 
products, because the cashier is not required to make a determination 
about whether the product is taxable at the point of sale.165  The court 
found that the difference in availability, opportunity for purchase, and 
subsequently the “differences in revenue between classifications 
constitute[d] a real and substantial difference” between the pre-made 
beverages that are taxed and the custom-made drinks that are not.166  
Additionally, the court determined that imposing the tax on made-to-
order beverages would be administratively burdensome, further 
demonstrating a real and substantial difference between a seemingly 
similar class of beverages.167 
After concluding that there was a real and substantial difference 
between the tax on pre-made products and made-to-order beverages, 
the court determined that the tax’s structure bore a reasonable 
relationship to its objective of promoting health and lowering rates of 
obesity.  The court noted that it is “not constrained by the question of 
whether the legislature should have taxed all sweetened beverages 
that may contribute to obesity.”168  In its decision, the court referred 
to the “many findings from studies, agencies, and organizations 
explaining the adverse health impact of sweetened beverage 
consumption.”169 
The court also found that the SBTO was not unconstitutionally 
vague.  The Illinois Supreme Court has explained that “[a] statute can 
be impermissibly vague for one of two independent reasons: (1) if it 
fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits, or (2) if it 
authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”170  When examining whether a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, courts consider the statutory construction 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Id. at *4. 
 165. Id. at *6. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at *7–8. 
 168. Id. at *9. 
 169. Id. at *8. 
 170. City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enters., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 133, 165–66 (Ill. 2006).  
When the court considers statutes with civil, rather than criminal, penalties regulating 
economic matters, the test for vagueness is “less strict.” See Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017 
WL 3318078, at *9. 
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and plain language of the statute “in light of its common 
understanding and practice.”171  The plaintiffs’ arguments focused on 
the sale of drinks in non-predetermined size containers (fountain 
drinks) and alleged inconsistency with SNAP, the Illinois Retailers’ 
Occupation Tax, and the City of Chicago’s Alternative Pricing System 
Rules.172 
The plaintiffs alleged that the application of the tax to fountain 
drinks would lead to the imprecise collection of taxes, which could 
expose retailers to litigation.173  While the court acknowledged the 
possibility of imprecise collection, it decided that this did not meet the 
standard of rendering the ordinance unconstitutionally vague.174  The 
judgment noted that the ordinance allowed for a five percent discount 
on the amount of tax payable with respect to syrup or powder for 
fountain drinks, taking into account spillage and product preparation 
at the retail level.175 
The plaintiffs also alleged that the requirement for the tax to be 
included in the sale price means that retailers could not comply 
without violating federal law prohibiting application of state or local 
sales taxes on purchases made with SNAP benefits.176  The court held 
that this argument was overcome by the ordinance provisions 
requiring point-of-sale programing to avoid charging the tax on 
SNAP purchases or, if this was not possible, providing an immediate 
refund at the customer service desk or other location.177  The court 
made similar findings in relation to alleged conflicts with the Illinois 
Retailers’ Occupation Tax and the City of Chicago’s Alternative 
Pricing System Rules.178 
Despite the decision confirming its legal validity, the Cook County 
Board of Commissioners voted overwhelmingly to repeal the SBTO 
in October 2017.179  The tax appears to have been plagued by a lack 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Ill. Retail Merchs., 2017 WL 3318078, at *9. 
 172. Id. at *10. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at *10. 
 177. Id. at *11. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Associated Press & Julian Crews, Cook County Board Approves Repeal of 
Soda Tax, WGN9 (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:11 AM), http://wgntv.com/2017/10/11/vote-to-
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of popular support, fostered by the industry’s public messaging 
campaign, administrative issues, and multiple lawsuits.180 
D. San Francisco Soda Warning Ordinance 
In 2015, San Francisco became the first United States jurisdiction 
to pass legislation requiring soda companies to include a statement on 
advertisements warning of the health impacts of consuming sugar-
sweetened beverages.181  Specifically, the ordinance required 
companies to place warnings on advertisements on billboards, 
vehicles, and similar structures, stating: “WARNING: Drinking 
beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and 
tooth decay.  This is a message from the City and County of San 
Francisco.”182  The ordinance required that this warning occupy 
twenty percent of the total advertisement space.183  It applied to 
advertisements for non-alcoholic beverages containing caloric 
sweeteners and more than twenty-five calories per twelve ounces of 
beverage, with exemptions for milk, milk alternatives, and 100% 
natural fruit and vegetable juices.184  San Francisco’s purpose in 
requiring the warning was to “inform the public of the presence of 
added sugars and thus promote informed consumer choice that may 
result in reduced caloric intake and improved diet and health, thereby 
reducing illnesses to which [sugar-sweetened beverages] contribute 
and associated economic burdens.”185 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See Greg Trotter & Becky Yerak, Cook County Retailers Cheer Soda Tax 
Repeal: ‘This Was a Nightmare’, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 11, 2017, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-soda-tax-repeal-reaction-20171011-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6D3K-FB7V].  In addition to the lawsuit discussed in this 
Article, consumers sued retailers, including Walgreens, for allegedly misapplying the 
tax. Id. 
 181. Corey L. Andrews, San Francisco’s Sweetened-Beverage Warning Mandate 
and Ad Ban Treat on First Amendment, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:37 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2015/09/11/san-franciscos-sweetened-beverage-
warning-mandate-and-ad-ban-tread-on-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/AQ2X-
2NPS]. 
 182. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 42, div. 1, § 4202, 4203(a) (2016); Andrews, 
supra note 181. 
 183. Dorothy Atkins, Beverage Industry Fights SF Soda Warnings at 9th Circ., 
LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2017, 10:06 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/914135 
[https://perma.cc/VPS2-GMS4]; Court Blocks San Francisco Law Requiring 
Warnings on Soda Ads, CBS S.F. BAY AREA (Sept. 19, 2017, 4:05 PM) [hereinafter 
Court Blocks], http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2017/09/19/soda-ad-warning-label-
blocked-9th-circuit-court/ [https://perma.cc/96AS-MP62]. 
 184. HEALTH CODE § 4202. 
 185. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco (Am. Beverage II ), 
871 F.3d 884, 888–89 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing HEALTH CODE § 4201). 
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Shortly after the City passed the ordinance, the ABA, the 
California Retailers Association, and the California State Outdoor 
Advertising Association filed a suit in the United States District 
Court, Northern District of California, to preliminarily enjoin the 
ordinance, alleging that it violated the plaintiffs’ freedom of speech 
and unjustly targeted sugar-sweetened beverages as a contributing 
factor to the obesity epidemic.186  To obtain a preliminary injunction, 
a plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, 
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.”187 
At the district court level, the judge found that the plaintiffs were 
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and 
were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm if the ordinance went into 
effect.188  Furthermore, the district court found that even if the 
plaintiffs may succeed on the merits, the balancing test would weigh 
in favor of denying the injunction.189  The district court noted that the 
city had a reasonable basis to enforce the ordinance due to its interest 
in public health and safety.190  The plaintiffs subsequently appealed 
the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed 
the district court’s decision and upheld the preliminary injunction to 
enjoin the San Francisco ordinance.191 
First, the court of appeals found that the plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claims.192  The 
plaintiffs claimed that the warning label requirements infringed on 
their First Amendment right to freedom of speech.193  While the First 
Amendment freedom of speech protections may traditionally be 
associated with individual liberty, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
confirmed that these protections extend to commercial speech.194  
                                                                                                                 
 186. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 887–89; Atkins, supra note 183; see also Maura 
Dolan, Federal Appeals Court Blocks San Francisco Law Requiring Health 
Warnings on Soda, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-soda-san-francisco-20170919-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/DJA2-7FRP]. 
 187. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 188. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 889; Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of 
San Francisco (Am. Beverage I ), 187 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1145–46 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 189. See Am. Beverage I, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1146–47. 
 190. Id. at 1138, 1140, 1142, 1145. 
 191. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 888, 899; see also Court Blocks, supra note 183. 
 192. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 898. 
 193. Id. at 888. 
 194. “‘[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument 
to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy,’ the free flow of commercial 
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Regulations on the content of noncommercial speech are subject to 
strict scrutiny, meaning they are “presumptively unconstitutional and 
may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling state interests.”195  Regulations on 
commercial speech, such as sugary drink advertisements, are subject 
to a lesser standard.196  The lesser standard of scrutiny flows from the 
government’s “legitimate interest in protecting consumers from 
commercial harms.”197 
The level of scrutiny that applies to regulations on commercial 
speech depends on the nature of the regulation.198  Restrictions on 
“nonmisleading commercial speech regarding lawful activity” are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.199  Regulations that compel a 
disclosure, rather than affirmatively limit speech, are subject to the 
lesser standard of scrutiny set out by the Supreme Court in Zauderer 
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.200  
Here, the Ninth Circuit determined that the warning label constituted 
a compelled disclosure and, therefore, applied the Zauderer test.201  
The Zauderer test has three components—the compelled speech 
(1) must be purely factual and uncontroversial; (2) must not be 
unduly burdensome such that it may chill protected speech; and 
(3) must be reasonably related to a substantial government interest.202 
The Ninth Circuit found that the warning was not purely factual or 
uncontroversial because it “convey[ed] the message that sugar-
sweetened beverages contribute to [certain] health conditions 
regardless of the quantity consumed or other lifestyle choices.”203  
The judgment suggested that the warning would likely satisfy the first 
                                                                                                                 
information serves that end because it is indispensable to ensuring that economic 
decisions ‘in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed.’” Id. at 890 (quoting Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 
(1976)).  The Court has defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to 
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
 195. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
 196. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 891. 
 197. Id. at 890–91 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011)). 
 198. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 891. 
 199. Id. (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 
249 (2010)).  Intermediate scrutiny requires that regulations directly advance a 
substantial government interest and be “no more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest.” Id. (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
 200. 471 U.S. 626 (1985); see Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 891. 
 201. Id. at 892–93. 
 202. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 
626, 651 (1985). 
 203. Am. Beverage II, 871 F.3d at 895. 
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component of the Zauderer test if it stated that “overconsumption of 
sugar-sweetened beverages contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth 
decay” or “consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may 
contribute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”204  The Ninth 
Circuit also held that the “black box warning overwhelm[ed] the 
other visual elements in the advertisements” so much so that the 
compelled disclosure was “unduly burdensome” and would chill 
protected commercial speech in violation of the second component of 
the Zauderer test.205  Having ruled that San Francisco’s required 
warning failed the first two components of the Zauderer test, the 
court ruled that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of 
their First Amendment claim.206 
After establishing that the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the 
merits, the court then turned to the remaining three factors that 
determine whether a plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction.  
The court found that the plaintiffs would likely suffer irreparable 
harm because they had made a colorable First Amendment claim.207  
Next, the court balanced the hardships of each party and referred 
back to its conclusion that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the 
merits of their First Amendment claim.208  Finally, the court 
examined whether the injunction would be in the public interest and 
found that the public has a strong interest in upholding First 
Amendment principles.209  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
                                                                                                                 
 204. See id. at 893, 895.  The Court went on to explain that “[b]ecause San 
Francisco’s warning does not state that overconsumption of sugar-sweetened 
beverages contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay, or that consumption of 
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Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.12 (1986) (plurality opinion)). 
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at 894 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 15 n.12). 
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plaintiffs met the requirements for seeking a preliminary injunction 
and accordingly reversed the district court’s decision and granted the 
motion.210 
Public health and health law organizations, including the American 
Heart Association and the Public Health Law Center, filed amicus 
curiae briefs in the district court and the court of appeals.211  The 
briefs argued that the accuracy of the warnings is scientifically well 
established and that the warnings should easily survive review under 
the Zauderer framework.212  According to the Public Health Law 
Center, the court of appeals’ judgment relied on evidence produced 
by the industry that contradicts the well-established scientific 
evidence on the health impacts of sugary beverages that was 
presented in the amicus curiae briefs.213 
In October 2017, following the court of appeals’ ruling, the Public 
Health Law Center, together with nine other tobacco control and 
public health organizations, filed a further amicus brief requesting an 
en banc review by an expanded eleven-judge panel of the court of 
appeals.214  The brief argued that the court of appeals’ original 
decision misinterpreted the Zauderer test, jeopardizing government-
mandated public health warnings, including federal tobacco 
warnings.215  For example, the brief argues that the decision’s 
mischaracterization of the evidence-based warnings as “disputed 
policy views” may be used by the tobacco industry to challenge 
warnings mandated by the federal government.216  The brief also calls 
for the court to clarify that the requirement for a warning covering 
twenty percent of an advertisement does not render the regulation 
per-se unconstitutional.217  Federal law requires that some tobacco 
warnings occupy more than twenty percent of the packaging, meaning 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Id. at 899. 
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 214. See generally Am. Heart Ass’n et al. Ninth Circuit Brief, supra note 211. 
 215. Id. at 1, 3. 
 216. Id. at 1, 8–9. 
 217. Id. at 14–17. 
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the industry could cite the Ninth Circuit decision in support of a claim 
that tobacco warnings are unduly burdensome under the Zauderer 
test, rendering them unconstitutional.218 
The San Francisco soda warnings litigation shows that calling into 
question well-established evidence can help industry undermine 
evidence-based warnings, threatening federal, state, and local efforts 
to protect consumers from harmful commercial goods.  The case 
confirms the importance of courts’ interpretation of complex 
scientific evidence in the context of First Amendment challenges to 
public health-based restrictions on commercial speech, and the need 
for governments to produce clear and convincing evidence in support 
of their regulations. 
In January 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to hear 
the matter en banc.219  An eleven-judge panel will further weigh the 
protection of commercial speech against the government’s interest in 
regulating advertisements to protect public health, providing further 
opportunity for San Francisco to defend its evidence-based 
warnings.220 
V.  LEGAL VIABILITY AND POLITICAL SUSTAINABILITY OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT MEASURES TO PROMOTE HEALTHIER DIETS 
When public health measures come into tension with the potential 
for sales and profitability, the food and beverage industry dedicates 
significant resources to protecting its position.221  The industry’s 
strategy comprises lobbying, funding scientific research, public 
messaging, and litigation.222  Local governments investing in measures 
to promote healthier diets must anticipate and prepare to overcome 
each of these interrelated but distinct challenges.  This part 
recommends steps to help ensure legal viability, political 
sustainability, and public support. 
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A. Legal Viability 
The small but growing body of litigation and jurisprudence relating 
to government interventions to promote healthy diets presents a 
useful source of information to identify legal bases and arguments 
that industry litigants invoke to support their suits against local 
governments.  This information may assist local government officials 
to formulate and, if necessary, defend their laws against industry 
litigation, ensuring legal viability. 
Two basic but important issues are regulatory authority and 
preemption.223  The case opposing New York City’s Portion Cap Rule 
illustrates the importance of ensuring that laws and regulations are 
grounded within the scope of the regulatory authority of the specific 
government body making the rule.  In that case, the court’s decision 
that the New York City Board of Health had exceeded the scope of 
its regulatory authority led to the invalidation of an innovative public 
health measure.224  The judgments in the Philadelphia and Cook 
County soda tax decisions also analyzed the regulatory authority of 
the respective rule-making bodies,225 confirming the importance of 
this issue for municipal law-makers.  In addition to regulatory 
authority, the law-making process may also affect the likelihood of 
litigation and the longer-term viability of local government public 
health measures.  Of the eight U.S. jurisdictions that have adopted 
public health-based soda taxes, the five that were passed via ballot 
measures have not been challenged in court, while two of the three 
adopted by governing boards have faced industry litigation.226 
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Preemption is another key legal issue local governments may face 
when adopting public health measures to promote healthier diets.227  
Preemption may flow from legislation designed to prevent local 
jurisdictions from legislating on nutrition-related issues or when local 
laws address a subject covered by existing state or federal law.228  This 
issue was raised with respect to both federal and state laws in soda tax 
litigation in Philadelphia.229  The Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania rejected the preemption argument because 
Philadelphia’s tax is levied on non-retail distributions, whereas the 
relevant state and federal laws addressed retail sales to consumers.230  
The structure of public health-based taxes, in particular the point in 
the distribution chain at which they are levied, may be an important 
factor to overcome potential challenges based on preemption. 
Evidence in support of local government public health measures 
can play an important role in the adjudication of their legality.  
Relevant evidence includes analysis of the health impacts of regulated 
products and evidence of effectiveness of regulatory measures.  
Courts use this type of evidence to determine whether regulations are 
permissible, especially when courts are called upon to determine the 
legality of public health measures that interfere with competing rights 
and interests.231  For example, as part of its determination of whether 
San Francisco’s soda warnings unlawfully infringed on commercial 
freedom of speech, the Ninth Circuit considered the scientific 
evidence of the health impacts of sugary drinks.232  In holding that the 
required warning was not “purely factual and uncontroversial” as 
required by Zauderer, the court held: 
By focusing on a single product, the warning conveys the message 
that sugar-sweetened beverages are less healthy than other sources 
of added sugars and calories and are more likely to contribute to 
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obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay than other foods.  This message is 
deceptive in light of the current state of research on the issue.233 
The Ninth Circuit’s conclusions appear to rely heavily on evidence 
presented by the industry litigants, which contradicts well-established 
scientific evidence that sugary drinks have a unique impact on public 
health.234  This case illustrates the importance of the evidentiary basis 
for public health measures.  Perhaps even more crucially, local 
lawmakers should anticipate that industry litigants will argue for the 
most demanding evidentiary standards possible and produce evidence 
that contradicts or questions health impacts and effectiveness.  Local 
government defendants should prepare to clearly articulate applicable 
evidentiary standards and produce evidence to prove scientific facts 
relevant to the case before judges who may not be familiar with 
public health concepts and issues. 
Many of the legal bases and arguments used by the food and 
beverage industry to challenge interventions to promote healthier 
diets reflect those used by the tobacco industry to challenge tobacco 
control laws.235  An analysis of tobacco industry litigation to deter 
local public health measures identified preemption as a common basis 
for successful legal challenges.236  As with the Cook County and 
Philadelphia soda taxes, the tobacco industry has challenged tobacco 
taxes on the basis that they violate tax uniformity clauses of state 
constitutions.237  Like the San Francisco soda warnings litigation, the 
tobacco industry has invoked the First Amendment to challenge 
federal regulations requiring tobacco companies to include graphic 
images as part of warnings on tobacco packages.238   The soda 
industry’s efforts to contradict or question scientific evidence 
surrounding the health impacts of their products and the effectiveness 
of government interventions reflect a long history of similar conduct 
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by the tobacco industry.239  Acknowledging differences between the 
tobacco industry240 and the food and beverage industry, and their 
respective products, tobacco litigation is another source of 
information for public officials working to ensure the legal viability of 
interventions to promote healthier diets. 
B. Political Sustainability 
In addition to legal viability, local lawmakers should also take into 
account the political sustainability of measures to promote healthier 
diets.  Cook County provides an example where, although the legality 
of the soda tax was confirmed by the circuit court, the measure was 
ultimately repealed by the Board of Commissioners.241  As discussed 
in Part IV, the repeal followed an industry-led campaign that fueled 
public opposition against the soda tax. 
Public demand for public health measures is key to their adoption 
and their ongoing political sustainability.242  Strategies to increase 
public demand include educating and informing the public to better 
understand the need for, and benefits of, interventions that promote 
healthy diets.243  Evidence of the positive public health impacts and 
cost-effectiveness of measures can bolster public support.244  
Increased public awareness of industry misconduct, such as the 
obfuscation of scientific evidence on sugar and heart disease, 
discussed in Part III, may also contribute to public support for 
regulation of industries and products.245 
Ensuring the legal viability and political sustainability of public 
health interventions are interrelated but distinct challenges.  The food 
and beverage industry’s public messaging campaigns differ from 
arguments put forth in litigation.  The industry’s public messaging 
strategy incorporates positive messages about consuming their 
products as part of a “balanced,” physically active lifestyle.246  
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Industry strategy also includes negative messages about government 
interventions, such as “nanny state” infringement on personal 
freedoms and commercial interests, and negative economic impacts of 
regulations on vulnerable population groups.247  These arguments are 
not replicated in the courtroom, where industry attorneys focus on 
legal grounds including regulatory authority and preemption.248 
Although based on different arguments, industry lawsuits and 
public messaging against government interventions tend to 
complement and reinforce one another.  Local government 
involvement as defendants in industry-initiated litigation, which tends 
to be well publicized, lengthy, and expensive, may negatively 
influence the public’s opinion of public health interventions, and 
contribute to impetus for repeal.  The Cook County lawsuit, for 
example, has been identified as a factor that may have contributed to 
the repeal of that jurisdiction’s soda tax.249  Although it is difficult to 
measure, the politically charged nature of some public health 
interventions, as well as vigorous public debates, may influence 
judicial decision-making when measures are challenged in court.  
Local government officials should anticipate and prepare to counter 
industry challenges in both the public domain and in the courtroom. 
Overall, litigation to date suggests that lawsuits challenging local 
government laws and regulations can be avoided or overcome with 
careful design, law-making processes, implementation, and 
evaluation.250  Together with legal viability, political sustainability is 
also important to ensure that measures impact consumption patterns 
and, ultimately, improve the public’s health. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A HEALTHIER AND MORE PRODUCTIVE 
FUTURE 
Governments have numerous effective, evidence-based tools to 
encourage healthier diets and prevent obesity, thus promoting health 
and productivity.  Yet, diet-related diseases remain a great public 
health threat in the United States and globally.251  Local governments 
have emerged as key innovators in nutrition promotion, adopting 
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laws and policies that aim to increase healthier consumption patterns.  
Regulation of the food and beverage industry and products often 
comes into tension with the industry’s interest in maximizing profits 
from sales of unhealthy products.  Industry litigation, together with 
lobbying, research funding, and public messaging campaigns, threaten 
evidence-based public health measures, which aim to address the 
obesity epidemic and reduce diet-related cardiovascular disease, type 
2 diabetes, and cancer.  The industry’s strategy to prevent or 
undermine public health measures may also discourage adoption of 
similar, or better, measures by other governments.  The growing body 
of litigation and jurisprudence relating to government interventions 
to promote healthy diets, together with experience in tobacco control, 
presents a wealth of knowledge for public health policy makers to 
develop measures that are legally viable and politically sustainable.  
With careful planning and design, local lawmakers can avoid or 
overcome industry opposition and build on global momentum for 
local health. 
 
